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SECURITIES LAW SURVEY
I. OVERVIEW
Caveat brokers, registered representatives, accountants, attorneys
and others: investors are not taking their lumps. The investors of today
refuse to merely accept the failure or poor performance of their invest-
ments. Rather, many sue the deepest pocket and recover handsomely
for it.' Investors sue broker-dealers for breach of trust and confidence;
brokerage houses for respondeat superior or controlling person liability
and inadequate supervision; other individuals, including accountants
and attorneys, for aiding and abetting; and everyone and anyone for se-
curities fraud. The dramatic increase in the number and magnitude of
law suits2 raises concerns that untempered liability for brokers, regis-
tered representatives, accountants and attorneys will have far reaching
negative effects on capital markets. 3 Concern over the implications to
1. In 1991, the average claim against accounting firms was for $85 million and the
average settlement was for $2.7 million. Big Six Call for Reforms to Slash Litigation Costs, 24
Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 36, 1460 (Sept. 4, 1992) [hereinafter Big Six]. In 1992, the
accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand agreed to pay $50 million to settle the Texas Minis-
cribe case. Company News: A $128.1 million Settlement Reached in Miniscribe Case, N. Y. TIMES,
June 4, 1992, at D5.
2. According to Rep. W.J. Tauzin, (D-LA), 1990 and 1991 witnessed a large jump in
the number of securities class action lawsuits filed, with 614 suits filed in all-more than
the combined total of the previous five years put together. Big Six CPA Firms Join Battle
Against Deep Pocket Lawsuits; Bills Reduce Liability, 2 THoMsoN's INT'L BANK AccouNTANr, 33,
1 (Sept. 7, 1992). According to a position paper from the Big Six accounting firms (Arthur
Andersen, Deloitte & Touche, Coopers & Lybrand, Ernst & Young, KPMG Peat Marwick
and Price Waterhouse) the accounting profession as a whole faces about 4,000 lawsuits
and $30 billion in claims. Liability System Threatens Independent Audits; U.S. Capital Markets and
Global Competitiveness at Risk; Tort Reform Needed Now, PR Newswire, N. Y., August 31, 1992,
available in LEXIS, Nexis library (Fin. News) [hereinafter Liability System]. In 1991 the Big
Six's total expenditures for settling claims was $477 million, an 18% increase over 1990
which were $404 million. Id. A survey by the American Institute of Certified Public Ac-
countants ("AICPA") indicates that claims against firms other than the Big Six rose by
two-thirds between 1987 and 1991. Id.
3. See Liability System, supra note 2, at *2. Speculators and their attorneys have utilized
the securities laws to coerce nuisance settlements. Id. Where a company has had volatile
stock price fluctuations, namely mid-sized, high-technology high-growth companies new to
the market, speculators file class action securities fraud suits with the sole purpose of co-
ercing settlements. Id. To increase the size and prospect of settlement, speculators join
accountants and other deep pockets who bear joint and several liability, even where their
participation was minimal. Id. Under the law the company as the defendant bears the
burden for the legal costs of discovery. Id. Thus, threats of huge legal fees, tarnished
corporate image, and joint and several liability induce companies to settle these nuisance
suits despite their innocence. Id
In the aftermath of the failure of the accounting firm of Laventhol & Horwath in 1990,
the largest bankruptcy for a professional corporation in U.S. history, accounting firms
practice risk reduction. Big Six, supra note 1. Firms avoid what they perceive as high risk
audit clients and industries, including financial institutions, insurance companies, real es-
tate investment firms, high-technology firms and private companies making initial public
offerings. Id. As a result, three hundred corporate, accounting, financial institution and
association members including the Big Six accounting firms, the AICPA, Merrill Lynch &
Co., Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc., the National Association of Corporate Directors, the
Public Securities Association and the Securities Industry Association have joined together
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American business of private securities litigation has prompted mem-
bers of Congress in both houses to introduce legislation 4 aimed at curb-
ing implied private securities fraud suits under Rule lOb-5. 5
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has not been im-
mune from these concerns or trends. During the recent survey period
the circuit decided three cases involving brokers' and accountants' liabil-
ity. In all of them, the court refused to attach liability to the brokers or
accountants. The court's language in these decisions suggests a judicial
attitude reflecting curtailment of, or at least a refusal to expand, the
scope of Rule 1 Ob-5 liability. In Board of County Commissioners of San Juan
County v. Liberty Group,6 the court reversed the trial court's imposition of
liability against a broker for churning based on simple negligence. In
O'Connor v. R.F. Lafferty & Co., Inc. ,7 the court upheld a grant of summary
judgment in favor of the broker, determining that the investor failed to
establish the requisite scienter for an unsuitability claim under Rule 1Ob-
5. In curtailing Rule 1Ob-5 liability, the court imposed an additional re-
quirement of control to establish an unsuitability claim. Finally, in
Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.,8 the court dismissed securities
fraud claims against an accounting firm for failure to allege fraud with
particularity and upheld a summary judgment ruling in favor of the ac-
counting firm on aiding and abetting claims.
in the Coalition to Eliminate Abusive Securities Suits ("CEASS") to launch a coordinated
federal and state effort to achieve liability reform. Securities Suits Reform Bill Lauded by Busi-
ness Coalition, PR Newswire, N. Y., August 13, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library (Fin.
News). According to Philip B. Chenok, president of the AICPA, "The current doctrine of
joint and several liability must be replaced if accountants are to continue performing au-
dits in high-risk situations such as initial public offerings." Id. Chenok pointed out that a
competent outside audit is a requirement for any company seeking to raise capital in the
stock or bond markets. Id.
4. S. 3181, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) in the Senate Banking Committee and H.R.
5828, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) in the House Energy and Commerce Committee were
introduced to reduce frivolous securities fraud suits filed to coerce nuisance settlements.
To achieve this both bills carry provisions restricting the application of the joint and sev-
eral liability standard and limiting an actor's liability only to damages that result directly
from the actor's work. In addition, both bills provide judicial discretion that can require
unsuccessful plaintiffs to shoulder all legal costs. Thus, the bills reduce the coercive tools
available to speculators by altering joint and several liability to proportionate liability. The
bills also prescribe a disincentive for filing meritless claims. Voting on these bills is sched-
uled to occur early in 1993.
5. "Rule l0b-5" is the implied right of action for fraud in the purchase or sale of
securities found in Rule 1Ob-5 promulgated under the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). Rule lOb-5 provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which would oper-
ate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
6. 965 F.2d 879 (10th Cir. 1992).
7. 965 F.2d 893 (10th Cir. 1992).
8. 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992).
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II. RECENT TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS SHOW A RELUCTANCE TO
EXPAND THE SCOPE OF SECURITIES FRAUD LIABILITY.
A. Rule 10b-5 Liability Not Expanded to Include Acts of Mere Negligence
In Board of County Commissioners v. Liberty Group the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the trial court's expansion of "scienter" to include acts of negli-
gence. In Liberty Group, the County of San Juan, New Mexico ("County")
used a number of brokers for its investments. Liberty Group executed
thirteen transactions in which it charged mark-ups over the price paid
for the bonds, but never informed the County of the charges. After the
mark-ups were discovered by the State Auditor, the County brought suit
under Rule lOb-5 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions Act ("RICO"). 9 The County claimed that Liberty's registered rep-
resentative had churned the County's account by making frequent trades
and charging excessive and undisclosed mark-ups.' 0 The jury charge
included Instruction 24, which described the requisite mental state for
liability on a Rule lOb-5 churning claim as follows:
The plaintiff, in order to recover on his 10B-5 claim, must show
that the defendant acted knowingly, that is, with a mental state
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud. In order
to establish this element the plaintiff must prove by the greater
weight of the evidence that the defendant made material state-
ments which he knew to be false, or made statements with reck-
less disregard for their truth or falsity, or knew of the existence of
material facts which were not disclosed and he should have realized their
significance in the making of an investment decision, or knew of the
existence of material facts which were not disclosed although
he knew that knowledge of those facts would be necessary to
make his other statements not misleading."I
The defendants objected that this instruction incorrectly stated the law,
asserting that the instruction allowed liability to be imposed for mere
negligence. 12 The court denied the objection and the jury found Lib-
erty liable for churning. 13 Liberty appealed.
Although no cases by the U.S. Supreme Court confirm the existence
of a churning cause of action, the lower courts generally agree to its
existence and elements. 14 Churning, under Rule 1Ob-5, developed from
the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) Know Your Customer Rule, 15 the
National Association of Security Dealers (NASD) Rules of Fair Practice' 6
9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1964 (1990).
10. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d at 881.
11. Id. at 883.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 881-82.
14. See Mark C. Jensen, Abuse of Discretion Claims Under Rule l0b-5: Churning, Unsuitabil-
ity, and Unauthorized Transactions, 18 SEc. REG. L.J. 374, 377-78 (1991).
15. The New York Stock Exchange, Know Your Customer Rule provides: "Every member
organization is required.., to (1) Use due diligence to learn the essential facts relative to
every customer, every order, every cash or margin account accepted or carried by such
organization." NYSE Rule 405, CCH New York Stock Exchange Manual 1 2405 (1990).
16. National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, sec. 2(a)
2152 (1991):
1993]
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and the Securities and Exchange Rule 15c 1-7(a). 17 In the Tenth Circuit,
the elements of a churning claim include: (1) excessive trading in light
of the plaintiff's investment objectives; (2) control over the trading in
the account; and (3) scienter. 18
The excessive trading element, unique in each churning case, de-
pends upon the investor's objectives and the communication of those
objectives to the broker. As a question of fact, excessive trading has
been found primafacie where the annual turnover rate, the dollar value of
the investor's transactions with his broker for the entire year divided by
the investor's average monthly equity in his account, is greater than
six. 19 However, some have criticized this turnover rate test.2 0 The Fifth
Circuit, for example, in determining "excessive trading" also considered
the nature and objectives of the account, the in-and-out trading, the
holding period of the respective securities, the broker's profit, the NYSE
Know Your Customer Rule and the NASD suitability rules.2 1
The second element, control, occurs where the broker has actual
discretionary authority to execute transactions for the investor without
prior authorization. Where the broker lacks discretionary authority,
control may occur de facto. For instance, where the investor lacks the
ability to evaluate recommendations and to exercise his or her own in-
dependent judgment, courts consider the broker to possess de facto
control. 22 In determining de facto control, some courts focus on the
investor's capacity or practical ability to evaluate the broker's recom-
mendations and to reject unsuitable transactions. 23 Other courts con-
sider that as long as the investor has the capacity to exercise his final
In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security, a
member shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is
suitable for such customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by such
customer as to his other securities holdings and as to his financial situation and
need.
17. Rule 15cl-7(a) prohibits excessively large or excessively frequent trading in dis-
cretionary accounts. The Rule provides:
The term manipulative deceptive or other fraudulent device or contrivance as used in sec-
tion 15(c) of the Act, is hereby defined to include any act of any broker, or dealer
or municipal securities dealer designed to effect with or for any customer's ac-
count in respect to which such broker, dealer or municipal securities dealer his
agent or employee is vested with any discretionary power in any transactions of
purchase or sale which are excessive in size or frequency in view of the financial
resources and character of such account.
C.F.R. § 240.15cl-7(a) (1992).
18. See, e.g., Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 893; Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, 888 F.2d 696 (10th Cir. 1989); Hotmar v. Lowell H. Listrom & Co., 808 F.2d 1384
(10th Cir. 1987).
19. Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814, 821 (9th Cir. 1980).
20. See, e.g., Norman S. Poser, Options Account Fraud: Securities Churning in a New Context,
39 Bus. LAw. 571, 596-98 (1984) (criticizing the turnover rate as a measure of excessive
trading because it ignores other factors).
21. Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., Inc., 637 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1981). See also Know
Your Customer Rule, NYSE Rule 405, CCH New York Stock Exchange Manual 2405
(1990); National Association of Securities Dealers, Rules of Fair Practice, Art. III, sec. 2,
2152 (1991).




right to say "yes" or "no," the investor controls the account.2 4
In Liberty Group, the Tenth Circuit did not delve into an analysis of
the excessive trading or control elements for churning. Rather, the
court determined the case on the issue of the final element, the requisite
mental state of scienter, 25 and particularly the defendant's assertion that
Rule lOb-5 liability required more than mere negligence.2 6 Scienter,
common to all Rule lOb-5 claims, exists in a churning claim when a bro-
ker acted with actual intent to defraud or with a reckless disregard of the
investor's interests.
2 7
In Ernst & Ermst v. Hochfelder,2 8 the United States Supreme Court
established that lOb-5 liability required scienter, but expressly declined
to decide whether scienter included "recklessness." 2 9 Six years after
Hochfelder, the Tenth Circuit joined an emerging trend3 0 deciding this
question in the affirmative. 3 ' The court stated that reckless behavior
includes "an extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care,
and which presents a danger of misleading buyers or sellers that is either
known to the defendant or so obvious that the actor must have been
aware of it."-3 2 As a result of this and other decisions, Rule 1Ob-5 liabil-
ity had expanded to include reckless behavior.
In Liberty Group, the Tenth Circuit had opportunity to further ex-
pand liability to include acts of mere negligence. Liberty, the defendant,
recognized that the language "should have realized" in Instruction 24
provided a finding of fault based on that lesser standard. Liberty argued
that scienter should not be expanded because Hochfelder required "much
more than mere negligence."13 3 The Tenth Circuit agreed. It held the
trial court's instruction on the Rule lOb-5 count, allowing a finding of
fault based on the simple negligence standard of "should have realized,"
to be error as a matter of law.3 4 In doing so the Tenth Circuit restricted
an expansion of the scope of Rule lOb-5 liability to acts of simple
negligence.
24. Carras v. Burns, 516 F.2d 251, 258 (4th Cir. 1975) (stating investor has control if
she has "sufficient financial acumen to determine her own best interests and she acqui-
esces in the broker's management").
25. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d at 883.
26. Id.
27. " 'Scienter is a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud.'" Id. (quoting Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976)).
28. 425 U.S 185 (1976).
29. Id.
30. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 961-62 (5th Cir. 1981);
McLean v. Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190, 1197 (3d Cir. 1979); Mansbach v. Prescott, Ball &
Turben, 598 F.2d 1017, 1023 (6th Cir. 1979); Nelson v. Serwold, 576 F.2d 1332, 1337 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 970 (1978); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillon & Co., 570 F.2d 38,
44 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039 (1978); Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553
F.2d 1033, 1039-40 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).
31. Hackbart v. Holmes, 675 F.2d 1114, 1117 (10th Cir. 1982) (expressly holding
"recklessness satisfies the scienter requirement").
32. Id. at 1118.
33. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d at 883 (citing Hochfelder, 425 U. S. at 193).
34. Id. at 882-83.
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B. Primary and Secondary Liability Restricted Under Rule lOb-5.
1. Primary Liability Restricted for Breach of Trust and
Confidence by Imposing the Element of Control
In O'Connor v. R. F. Lafferty & Co., the Tenth Circuit analyzed a claim
of unsuitability and added the requirement of control. In 1975, Carol
O'Connor received $200,000 from her divorce and deposited the entire
sum into an account with the investment firm of R.F. Lafferty & Com-
pany, Inc. ("Lafferty"), to be handled by Roy Foulke.3 5 She gave Laf-
ferty and Foulke complete discretion to handle her account. Foulke
knew that she relied on him to make all decisions concerning the ac-
count, that maintaining a savings account was her only prior investment
experience and that her objective was to receive a fixed monthly income.
When O'Connor became concerned about the value of her account she
directed Foulke to stop all trading. Claiming that Foulke and Lafferty
purchased securities unsuitable for her investment objective, she
brought suit under Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and Rule lOb-5 alleg-
ing liability against Foulke for unsuitability and against Lafferty as con-
trolling person and under the doctrine of respondeat superior.3 6 The
trial court granted summary judgment, finding that the defendants
lacked the requisite scienter to sustain such a claim.3 7 The court also
found that although the defendants had invested in unsuitable securi-
ties, O'Connor could not demonstrate justifiable reliance on the
purchases where she knew that the securities were unsuitable and, acting
recklessly, failed to investigate.3 8 O'Connor appealed.39
In affirming the summary judgment order, the Tenth Circuit, in its
analysis of the unsuitability claim, recognized that although the elements
for churning were well established, the elements for unsuitability were
not. As with churning, unsuitability claims are premised on the NYSE
Know Your Customer Rule and the NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
40
Courts analyze unsuitability as either a claim based on material omis-
sions or misrepresentations, or as a claim based on fraudulent prac-
tices. 4 1 Unsuitability claims based on material omission or
misrepresentation are widely accepted, amounting to little more than
specialized versions of ordinary omission or misrepresentation claims.
4 2
35. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 895.
36. Id. at 896.
37. Id. at 893.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See supra note 15-16.
41. See San Jose v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., No. C 84-20601 RFP, 1991
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8318, (N.D. Cal. June 6, 1991).
42. Id. at *3. "Under this [omission] theory, it would appear that a suitability claim is
merely a specialized form of an ordinary omission claim. Id.
For cases accepting unsuitability claims based on omission or misrepresentation, see
Lefkowitz v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham, Co., 804 F.2d 154, 155 (1st Cir. 1986); Lazzaro
v. Manber, 701 F. Supp. 353, 363 (E.D.N.Y. 1988); Arlington Heights Police Pension Fund
v. Poder, 700 F. Supp. 405, 406 (N.D. Il. 1988); Frota v. Prudential-Bache Sec., Inc.,
[1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,253 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Rush v. Op-
penheimer & Co., 592 F. Supp. 1108, 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); M & B Contracting, Corp. v.
[Vol. 70:4
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An ordinary omission claim occurs when the defendant fails to state a
material fact necessary to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading. 43 How-
ever, for this failure to disclose to be actionable, the defendant must
have had a duty to disclose that information. 44 This duty arises out of
relationship of trust and confidence between parties. 4 5 In the typical
securities case, the defendant's duty arises from the fiduciary relation-
ship between the broker and the investor.4 6 Thus, an omission or mis-
representation based unsuitability claim arises when the defendant,
knowing of plaintiff's investment objectives, recommends a course of
trading at odds with those objectives. The broker, in effect, is omitting
to tell the investor about the unsuitability of the recommendation.
4 7
The broker may also be breaching a duty to disclose the nature of the
recommended transaction in such a way that the investor could under-
stand its ramifications.
48
In Lafferty, however, Ms. O'Connor did not assert that the registered
representative failed to tell her the stocks he purchased were unsuitable.
Rather, she claimed that he fraudulently purchased stocks for her ac-
count. She asserted unsuitability not on omission or misrepresentation,
but on fraud by conduct. Unsuitability claims based on fraudulent prac-
tices or fraud by conduct are less settled than omission unsuitably claims
and courts tend to mix the concepts of traditional securities fraud and
fraud by conduct.4 9 Due to these differing approaches, a uniform set of
elements has yet to be established, though a consensus seems to be
emerging. The Second Circuit, in Clark v. John Lamula & Co.,50 first
developed elements for unsuitability not based on misrepresentation or
omission. The early cases did not describe the claim or define its ele-
Dale, 601 F. Supp. 1106 (E.D. Mich. 1984); Mauriber v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 567
F. Supp. 1231, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
Procedure in unsuitability cases relates to procedures under traditional securities
fraud claims, but the plaintiff's allegations of unsuitability must be sufficiently specific and
must be material to an ordinary investor. Craighead v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F.2d 485,
493-94 (6th Cir. 1990); Franks v. Cavanaugh, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,441, 92,845 (S.D.N.Y. 1989). See also Osborn v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 853 F.2d
616, 618 (8th Cir. 1988) (upholding claim dismissal where plaintiff failed "to identify any
allegedly false representations or a single trade made because of improper advice"); Le/ko-
witz, 804 F.2d at 156 (finding investor's allegations insufficient to establish what objectives
were); Bischoff v. G.K. Scott & Co., 687 F. Supp. 746, 750-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating
alleged investment objectives were insufficiently specific and alleged nondisclosures too
vague). See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
44. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
45. Id. at 230.
46. Leason v. Rosart, 811 F.2d 1322 (9th Cir. 1987)(holding brokers have a fiduciary
duty to their investors).
47. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 897. See also San Jose, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8318, at *3.
48. See, e.g., Vucinich v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 803 F.2d 454, 460 (9th
Cir. 1986); Kehr v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 736 F.2d 1283, 1286 (9th Cir.
1984).
49. Jensen, supra note 14, at 386-87.
50. 583 F.2d 594 (2d Cir. 1978).
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ments. 5 1 Under the Lamula test the plaintiff merely had to prove that
the broker made a recommendation of unsuitable securities with either
intent to defraud or reckless disregard for the investor's interests. 52 Un-
suitability could be found where the investor proved that the broker
knew or reasonably believed the recommended securities were unsuita-
ble but still recommended purchase to the investor.
53
The modem view, adopted by the Tenth Circuit, regards unsuitabil-
ity based on fraud by conduct analogous to, or part of, a churning
claim. 54 The courts' analysis of this unsuitability claim supports each of
the three elements of churning: (1) unsuitability rather than churning-
unreasonable quality of transactions rather than excessive quantity of
transactions); (2) scienter;5 5 and (3) control.5 6 The same requirements
that establish control in churning claims also define control in unsuita-
bility claims, i.e., control exists through actual discretionary authority on
the part of the registered representative, or de facto discretionary au-
thority due to the investor's inability to evaluate recommendations or to
exercise independent judgment.5 7 Virtually every case that allows fraud
by conduct-unsuitability claims to proceed involve allegations of con-
trol. However, these unsuitability claims are often combined with or
made part of churning claims, which necessarily require control. When
both claims are asserted courts do not articulate whether the unsuitabil-
ity analysis includes a separate element of control. This oversight
clouds the description and requirements of the claim for fraud by con-
duct-unsuitability. In a fraud by conduct claim the defendant has made
no overt representation. However, as with any other claim based on si-
51. See Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); Mihara v.
Dean Witter & Co., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980).
52. Id. at 600. As with the misrepresentation-based claim, the fraud by conduct claim
also requires the investors' allegations regarding their objectives and resources to be suffi-
ciently specific and material. This specificity with which the investor's objectives and re-
sources are communicated and known by the broker must be alleged and proven. See, e.g.,
Craighead, 889 F.2d at 490-91 (holding complaint must plead specific facts constituting
excessive trading); Penson v. Cowen & Co., [1989-1990 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,868 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (dismissing complaint for failing to allege with particular-
ity specific instructions to broker).
53. Lamula, 583 F.2d at 600.
54. The First Circuit described an unsuitability claim as going to the quality of the
securities compared with churning going to the quantity. Tiernan v. Blyth, Eastman, Dil-
lon & Co., 719 F.2d 1, 4-5 (lst Cir. 1983). Accord Lopez v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,881 (N.D. Cal. 1984). The
Tenth Circuit here held that "[f]raud by conduct is a violation of Rule lOb-5(a) and (c) and
is analogous to a churning claim." R.F. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 898.
55. As with other Rule lOb-5 claims, unsuitability requires scienter. Scienter in un-
suitability cases has been described as the intent to defraud the investor or the reckless
disregard of the investor's interests. See, e.g., Miley v. Oppenheimer & Co., 637 F.2d 318,
324 (5th Cir. 1981).
56. Some courts have explicitly required control in unsuitability claims. Wieringa v.
Oppenheimer & Co., [1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,986,
90,906 (N.D. Ohio 1985). See also Craighead, 899 F.2d at 493-94 (affirming dismissal of
unsuitability claim where control was not alleged). While other courts have allowed im-
plied control. Yet, some degree of control is required. See, e.g., Rolf, 637 F.2d at 80-81 (no
liability for executing orders for unsuitable securities). Accord Stander v. Financial Clear-
ing & Serv. Corp., 730 F. Supp. 1282 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
57. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
840 [Vol. 70:4
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lence, liability only occurs under Rule 10b-5 when there is a duty to
disclose between broker or agent and client. 58 Showing control estab-
lishes a registered representative's duty to his investor because an agent
generally has the duty not to misuse the principal's property placed in
his control. 59 If control is not required, an alternative duty must be es-
tablished to ensure the unsuitability doctrine satisfies rule lOb-5.
60
In Lafferty the Tenth Circuit recognized that other circuits required
a plaintiff to merely prove unsuitability and scienter to succeed on their
claim for unsuitability based on fraud by conduct. The Tenth Circuit
imposed the additional element of control. Accordingly a plaintiff must
prove three elements to maintain a fraud by conduct unsuitability claim:
(1) that the registered representative recommended-or in the case of a
discretionary account purchased-securities which are unsuitable in
light of the investor's objectives; (2) that the broker recommended or
purchased the securities with intent to defraud or with reckless disre-
gard for the investor's interests; and, (3) that the broker exercised con-
trol over the investor's account.6 ' Here the court determined that
although the defendants had invested in unsuitable securities, the plain-
tiff failed to establish the requisite scienter, since the conduct failed to
rise to the level of recklessness necessary to sustain a lOb-5 claim. 6 2 Ac-
cordingly, the court upheld summary judgment dismissing the unsuita-
bility claim, remanding only the state law negligence claims.
63
The facts in Lafferty allowed the court to analyze and decide the case
on the issue of scienter alone. Yet, the court went further and imposed
the additional requirement of control for fraud by conduct-unsuitability
claims, choosing to follow the trend to restrict the scope of Rule lOb-5
liability. This aggressive opinion illustrates the Circuit's reluctance to
follow other jurisdictions, which have extended the cause of action for
unsuitability. For example, in 1991, unsuitability claims were expanded
to include discount brokers who typically take orders, have no discre-
tionary authority, and make no recommendations. An arbitration panel
of the National Association of Securities Dealers ("NASD") awarded a
Florida investor $39,500 of the $132,000 he claimed to have lost trading
options with the brokerage firm of Charles Schwab & Co., Inc.64 The
panel premised its decision on suitability violations. Two of the three
arbitrators ruled that Schwab had neglected its "ongoing obligation" to
monitor the suitability of its client's investments, strategy and trading
decisions.6 5 The third arbitrator found Schwab's actions appropriate
under the circumstances because the broker appeared to assume an obli-
gation to determine suitability.6 6 Under either rationale the award ex-
58. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 235.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 402 (1977).
60. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 222.
61. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 898.
62. Id. at 898-900.
63. Id. at 900.
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panded unsuitability liability to brokers who neither make
recommendations nor have any discretionary authority.
6 7
Other courts have expanded broker liability by holding that a viola-
tion of the suitability rules support state law claims for fraud.6 8 This
increases liability by including "negligence" as the requisite mental state
sufficient for some state claims. 69 Still other courts have extended liabil-
ity by providing a private right of action for violations of the NYSE and
NASD suitability rules. 70 The majority of modem courts, however, re-
fuse to premise a private right of action upon a violation of an exchange
rule.7 1 Indeed, the Lafferty court refused to decide whether a violation
of the NYSE or NASD Rules gave rise to a private cause of action based
on negligence, reasoning that actions violating the unsuitability rules
give rise to Rule lOb-5 claims. 72 Since Rule lOb-5 violations require
proof of scienter, 73 the court refused, as in Liberty Group, to extend liabil-
ity to include acts of mere negligence.
74
2. Primary Liability Restricted for Failure to Reasonably
Supervise
a. Liability of the Brokerage Firm
In most cases where a substantial investment amount has been lost,
the investor seeks redress not only from the registered representative
but also from the brokerage firm and/or supervisors. Investors sue such
defendants for inadequate employee supervision of their fraudulent
salesman. In Lafferty, Ms. O'Connor brought suit against R.F. Lafferty &
Company for negligent failure to supervise the conduct of its registered
representative, Mr. Foulke.
75
The New York Stock Exchange and the Self Regulating Organiza-
tions (SRO) all require brokerage firms to reasonably supervise their
67. The Schwab decision followed a 1990 arbitration ruling that discount broker
Quick & Reilly pay an investor $106,653 for allowing him to trade in naked put options.
Quick & Reilly, Inc. and Q& R Clearing Corp. v. Barton, NYSE, No. 9002033, February
15, 1990. Like Schwab, Quick & Reilly had made no specific investment recommendations
to its client, nor retained any discretionary authority. Id.
68. See, e.g., Mihara v. Dean Witter & Co., Inc., 619 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1980); Twomey
v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 243 (1968).
69. See, e.g., Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 900 ("liability under the state analogue to § 12(2)
only requires negligence"). See CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-125(3) (1987). See also Pottern
v. Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc., 589 P.2d 1378, 1379 (1978) (ruling state analogue to federal
Section 12(2) requires only negligence).
70. Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 410 F.2d 135, 143 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 838 (1969); Rolf v. Blyth Eastman Dillon & Co., 424 F. Supp. 1021,
1040-43 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), modified on other grounds, 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978).
71. See, e.g., SSH Co. Ltd. v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 678 F. Supp. 1055, 1058
(S.D.N.Y. 1987).
72. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 897 n.5. "Federal courts recognize such a claim [unsuitability]
as a violation of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5." Id. at 897.
73. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
74. Liberty Group, 965 F.2d at 883. "[T]he appellants... [argue]... that Ernst & Ernst
v. Hochfelder ... established that lOb-5 liability requires much more than mere negli-
gence. This reading is correct." Id.
75. Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 903.
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registered representatives and establish systems to prevent these agents
from violating the securities laws and the rules and regulations of the
SROs. 76 A firm may be civilly liable or face regulatory sanctions for fail-
76. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides sanctions
against a broker-dealer found to have:
failed reasonably to supervise, with a view to preventing violations of the
provisions of such statutes, rules, and regulations, another person who commits
such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision. For the pur-
poses of this subparagraph (E) no person shall be deemed to have failed reason-
ably to supervise any other person, if- (i) there have been established procedures,
and a system for applying such procedures, which would reasonably be expected
to prevent and detect, insofar as practicable, any such violation by such other
person, and (ii) such person has reasonably discharged the duties and obligations
incumbent upon him by reason of such procedures and system without reason-
able cause to believe that such procedures and system were not being complied
with.
Section 15(f) of the Exchange Act requires broker-dealers to "establish, maintain and
enforce written policies and procedures reasonably designed... to prevent the misuse...
of material nonpublic information by such broker or dealer or any person associated with
such broker or dealer."
Section 2 IA of the Exchange Act provides civil penalties against controlling persons
who "knowingly or recklessly" fail to establish, maintain or enforce any policy or proce-
dure required under Section 15(f).
NASD Rules of Fair Practice, Article III, section 27 requires members to establish,
maintain and enforce written procedures for supervising activities of registered represent-
atives, reviewing customer accounts, and keeping records. Section 27 further requires that
members: (1) designate a registered principal for each type of the firm's business to carry
out the firm's supervisory obligations; (2) designate an office of supervisory jurisdiction for
each location; (3) assign registered persons to a supervisor; (4) make reasonable efforts to
ensure that the supervisory personnel are properly qualified; (5) designate a principal to
review the firm's supervisory practices and procedures and make recommendations to se-
nior management to assure compliance with the applicable rules and regulations; (6) es-
tablish a schedule of branch examinations; and (7) meet at least annually with each
registered representative to discuss compliance matters relevant to the representative.
The NASD has also recently required members to use their best efforts to obtain the most
recent Form U-5 for any person seeking employment in the capacity of a registered repre-
sentative and to conduct a thorough background search on all prospective account execu-
tives.
NYSE Rule 405(2) requires member organizations to "[s]upervise diligently all ac-
counts handled by registered representatives of the organization."
NYSE Rule 342 requires the person in charge of a group of employees to "reasonably
discharge his duties and obligations in connection with supervision and control of the
activities of those employees related to the business of their employer and compliance with
securities laws and regulations." The firm must also designate a senior person to have
"overall authority and responsibility for internal supervision and control of the organiza-
tion and compliance with securities laws and regulations." This person must then:
delegate to qualified principals or employees responsibility and authority for
supervision and control of each office, department or business activity, and pro-
vide for appropriate procedures of supervision and control [and] establish a sepa-
rate system of follow-up and review to determine that the delegated authority and
responsibility is being properly exercised.
NYSE Rule 342 also requires member firms to review proprietary trades of the firm
and trades of firm employees and family members for insider trading violations and other
manipulative and deceptive practices. It also requires that the firm prepare an annual re-
port to its chief executive officers, which discusses, among other matters, customer com-
plaints, internal investigations made during the year, significant compliance problems, and
compliance efforts and procedures.
NYSE Rule 351 requires that member firms submit quarterly written reports to the
NYSE signed by a senior officer of the firm stating that the firm has reviewed its proprie-
tary accounts and accounts of its employees and family members and that trades in those
accounts do not violate the Exchange Act or NYSE rules against insider trading and ma-
nipulative and deceptive devices. The firms may use sampling techniques to review pro-
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ing to reasonably supervise a registered representative who violates a
securities law or rule. 77 However, the brokerage firm may avoid liability
and sanctions by acting in good faith to fulfill its obligations. Good faith
may be established by showing the adequacy of a firm's supervision and
compliance systems.78 There is probably no single supervisory or com-
pliance system appropriate for all brokerage firms. Thus, the rules of
the Exchange, the various SROs, as well as the SEC, anticipate each bro-
kerage firm will develop its own system to ensure effective compliance
with the various laws, rules and regulations based on the nature of its
business. The established supervisory system, however, must meet vari-
ous SRO requirements. 79 A firm's noncompliance with its own policies
may result in liability.8 0
In upholding summary judgment in favor of the registered repre-
sentative, the Lafferty court avoided a complex analysis to determine
whether Lafferty inadequately supervised Foulke. The court held in-
stead that no claim for inadequate supervision may be maintained
against the brokerage firm without an underlying violation of a securities
law or rule by the registered representative.8 ' Thus, in restricting the
registered representative's liability by imposing a control requirement,
the Tenth Circuit has, in effect, restricted the scope of liability faced by
the representative's brokerage firm.
b. Compliance Department Personnel and Other Supervisors'
Exposure
The trend to restrict the scope of untempered exposure for inade-
quate supervision has been followed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC). Had the registered representative in Lafferty vio-
lated the securities laws, conceivably his superiors may have faced indi-
vidual sanctions for failure to adequately supervise. In determining
exposure for sanctions the SEC has focused on the lack of adequate pro-
cedures, 82 the failure to follow such procedures8 3 and the personal fail-
prietary accounts and employee accounts, provided that each employee account is
reviewed during one of the year's quarters. Rule 351 also requires that members provide
the Exchange with statistical information regarding customer complaints relating to mat-
ters designated by the Exchange. This provision is yet to be implemented by the
Exchange.
77. See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, §§ 21A & 15(b)(4)(E).
78. See, e.g., Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1984-85 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,936 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Smith v. Christie, [1981
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,828 (N.D. Cal. 1980).
79. See, e.g., NYSE Rules' 342, 351, 405, and 476 and NASD Rules of Fair Practice, art.
III, sec. 27, supra note 76.
80. Thropp v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 650 F.2d 817, 820 (6th Cir. 1981)
(finding negligence based on defendant's failure to diligently enforce own rules).
81. See Lafferty, 965 F.2d at 898-900.
82. See, e.g., Mabon Nugent & Co., Exchange Act Release No. 27301, 1989 SEC LEXIS
1865 (Sept. 27, 1989).
Effective supervision by broker-dealers is a critical element in the regulatory
scheme and its importance has increased as firms have grown in size. As broker-
dealers expand their activities through the acquisition of branch offices or into
new areas within the securities business, there must be a concomitant expansion
of their supervisory procedures to insure regulatory compliance and sound inter-
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ure of line and staff supervisors to supervise account executives.8 4
In re Chambers,8 5 decided by the SEC in April of 1990, indicated that
a chief compliance officer responsible for maintaining adequate supervi-
sory and compliance procedures within a brokerage firm could be held
personally liable under section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act 86 for defi-
ciencies in supervision. 8 7 The Chambers case was settled and therefore
offered little insight about the factual or legal basis for the SEC's posi-
tion or what steps compliance officers should take to avoid exposure.
The concerns raised in Chambers subsided following the decision of In re
Arthur James Huff.88
In March of 1991, the SEC commenced an enforcement action
against Huff, a vice president in the compliance department of
nal controls. Apart from adopting effective procedures, broker-dealers must pro-
vide effective staffing, efficient resources and a system of follow-up and review to
determine that any responsibility to supervise delegated to compliance officers,
branch managers and other personnel is being diligently exercised.
Id. at *2-3.
83. See, e.g., Barlage, Exchange Act Release No. 25563, 1988 SEC LEXIS 740 (April 8,
1988). The SEC found a branch manager liable for failing to supervise a registered repre-
sentative by not following and enforcing brokerage firm's supervisory policies and proce-
dures, by not enforcing non-solicitation bans, and by not stopping broker's fraudulent
solicitations. Id. The brokerage firm was also found to have failed to supervise the branch
manager. Id.
84. See, e.g., Louis R. Trujillo, Exchange Act Release No. 26635, 43 S.E.C. 690 (March
16, 1989). Trujillo, an administrative branch manager of Merrill Lynch, discovered some
broker misconduct and reported it to the branch manager, but his supervisory record was
"less than exemplary," since a more thorough investigation would have revealed addi-
tional misconduct. Id. Nevertheless, emphasizing that the statute requires only "reason-
able supervision under the attendant circumstances," and the limited scope of Trujillo's
authority, the SEC Commissioners held that the SEC staff had failed to prove that "Tru-
jillo's overall performance with respect to the activities of the broker amounted to a failure
to supervise." Id. The SEC found that Trujillo had made reasonable and diligent efforts
to inform the branch manager. Id. The SEC also noted the Trujillo had gone over the
branch manager's head to place the matter in the hands of higher ranking officials in Mer-
rill Lynch. Id. The SEC concluded:
while we believe that Trujillo could and perhaps should have taken such
steps sooner, our standard is that a manager (of any stripe) 'must respond reason-
ably when confronted with the indication of wrongdoing.' Trujillo's responses as
an 'administrative manager' were not unreasonable, and we should not ignore the
fact that his actions were a major factor in the broker's dismissal.
Id.
85. Exchange Act Release No. 27963, 1990 SEC LEXIS 808 (April 30, 1990).
86. Section 15(b)(4)(E) of the 1934 Act provides:
The Commission, by order, shall censure .... or revoke the registration of
any broker or dealer if it finds .... that such censure .... is in the public interest
and that such broker or dealer .... has failed reasonably to supervise, with a view
to preventing violations of the [securities laws], another person who commits
such a violation, if such other person is subject to his supervision.
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 15(b)(4)(E)15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E).
87. Chambers, 1990 SEC LEXIS 808 at *2. Pursuant to an offer of settlement, the SEC
entered an order against the Compliance Director of a regional firm finding that he failed
to adequately supervise two account executives who had churned investor accounts, en-
gaged in unsuitable transactions, and made oral misrepresentations to investors. Id. The
SEC found that the Director had been given the responsibility to ensure that the firm
adopted and enforced adequate supervisory and compliance procedures. Id. The firm's
Compliance Manual did not clearly vest responsibility in any supervisor, and thus, the SEC
found that the Director had failed to fulfill his responsibilities. Id.
88. In re Huff, [1990-91 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. Law Rep. (CCH) 84,719 (March
28, 1991).
19931 845
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
PaineWebber Inc., for the alleged failure to supervise a retail salesman
and his branch office manager. 89 Huff assisted the entire firm in estab-
lishing compliance criteria, while the firm looked to its branch managers
to directly supervise its sales staff in all sales activity. Thus, Huff did not
directly or indirectly supervise the activities of the retail salesman who
committed the underlying fraud. Notwithstanding this, the SEC filed
charges alleging Huff had supervisory responsibility for the salesman
and his branch manager.90 An administrative law judge found that Huff
had failed to exercise reasonable supervision over both the salesman
and the salesman's manager. 9 1 On appeal, four SEC Commissioners
unanimously voted to dismiss the proceeding, but in doing so took two
different approaches.
In one opinion, Chairman Breeden and Commissioner Roberts as-
sumed that Huff had the responsibility of supervising the salesman and
the branch manager. 92 They then examined whether Huff in fact exer-
cised supervision over the two in accordance with section 15(b)(4)(E).
The Commissioners determined that Huff satisfied the reasonableness
standard in his compliance efforts over the salesman because he had
previously recommended termination of the salesman after analyzing
the salesman's customer accounts. The Commissioners dismissed the
charge against Huff concerning his alleged deficient supervision of the
manager.93 In deciding this issue, Breeden and Roberts stated that "the
'failure to supervise' by a subordinate is not in and of itself a substantive
violation of the securities laws and, therefore, cannot be the predicate
upon which a superior can be sanctioned for a second-tier 'failure to
supervise.' 9 4 In their concurring opinion, Commissioners Lochner and
Schapiro agreed on the latter issue.9 5 Thus, a majority of four SEC
commissioners held that an individual with supervisory responsibilities
cannot be disciplined for failing to exercise reasonable supervision over
another person who did not personally violate the securities laws, but
rather was merely sanctioned for failure to supervise his or her
subordinate.
While the Breeden-Roberts opinion merely assumed that Huff was
responsible for supervising the salesman, the Lochner-Schapiro opinion
squarely addressed the issue of staff supervision verses line supervision.
Though not adopting a clear staff/line test, the two commissioners
noted that in order for section 15(b)(4)(E) to govern a particular situa-
tion, a "supervisory relationship" must exist. 96 With the exception of
"line supervisors," who have the power to hire, fire, reward or punish,
there is difficulty in determining whether one has the supervisory re-
89. Id. at 81,395.
90. Id. at 81,394.
91. Id. at 81,396.
92. Id. at 81,397.
93. Id. at 81,398.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 81,399.
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sponsibility of another. According to Lochner and Schapiro, in the con-
text of staff (non-line) supervision, such a relationship is found only
when, inter alia, it should have been clear to the supervisor that he was
responsible for the activities of another and that the supervisor had the
ability to take effective action to fulfill this responsibility. 9 7 In effect the
two commissioners had announced a definition of the term "supervisor"
for purposes of section 15(b)(4)(E). In their view a "supervisor" is a
person who "has been given (and knows or reasonably should know he
had been given) the authority and the responsibility for exercising such
control over one or more specific activities of a supervised person ... so
that such person could take effective action to prevent a violation" of the
securities laws or rules.
9 8
Thus, in Huff, the SEC established that deficient supervision by a
subordinate does not in and of itself provide a statutory basis for sanc-
tioning a superior. Absent a clear indication of personal involvement
and affirmative wrongdoing on the part of those to whom responsibility
is delegated, the SEC will not automatically place liability on senior
managers where a violation occurs at a level far removed from them.9 9
The SEC's position clearly restricts exposure to liability.
3. Secondary Liability Restricted for "Controlling Person" and
Respondeat Superior
Investors not only sue brokerage firms under primary liability for
inadequately supervising their registered representatives, but in addi-
tion they frequently pursue the firm for secondary liability. A brokerage
firm faces secondary liability under a number of different theories. In
Lafferty the plaintiff alleged that the brokerage firm was secondarily liable
both as a controlling person and under the doctrine of respondeat supe-
rior for the primary violations of its registered representative, Foulke.
Because secondary liability is so well established, courts rarely ques-
tion its basis' 0 0 even though federal security statutes do not expressly
prescribe such liability with the limited exception of "controlling per-
son" provisions. 1 1 The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet engaged in a
97. Id.
98. Id. at 81,401. Under Lochner and Schapiro's analysis, Huff was not the sales-
man's supervisor because Huff: (1) was not in a position to control the salesman's activi-
ties through the traditional methods of reward or punishment and (2) was never clearly
given, by his own superiors, authority or responsibility for the salesman's conduct.
At the same time, these Commissioners strongly cautioned that a firm itself may vio-
late the statute if it "fails clearly to assign such supervisory authority and responsibility to
specific individuals" as part of its statutory responsibility. Id.
99. Id. at 81,402.
100. See William H. Kuehnle, Secondary Liability Under the Federal Securities Laws - Aiding
and Abetting, Conspiracy, Controlling Person, and Agency: Common-Law Principles and The Statutory
Scheme, 14J. CORP. L. 313, 315 (1988).
101. Securities Act of 1933 § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1990); Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t (1990). A few express provisions for secondary liability
under an aiding and abetting theory also exist. For example, section 209(e) of the Invest-
ment Advisors Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(e) (1990), and for broker-dealers, section
15(b)(4)(E) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1990).
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detailed analysis of the application of secondary liability concepts to the
federal securities laws. 10 2 However, it has witnessed such an applica-
tion. '0 3 In order to find secondary liability the plaintiff must prove that
the primary violator performed the central act proscribed by the statute
or rule.' 0 4 The secondary violator acquires liability because he assisted
or supported the primary violator's act.' 0 5 or through a relationship
with the primary violator. Secondary liability from a relationship can be
based on either common-law respondeat superior liability or statutory
liability for "controlling persons."' 0 6 Although there are some differ-
ences between the principal-agent relationship in agency law and the
control relationship in the statutory provisions, the imposition of liabil-
ity under the two concepts of respondeat superior and control person is
quite similar.
Under the common law of agency, a principal may be liable for the
conduct of his agent. The doctrine of respondeat superior provides: "A
master is subject to liability for the torts of his servants committed while
acting in the scope of their employment."' 1 7 Under securities laws
there are two provisions which hold controlling persons liable to the
same extent as the persons they control. Section 15 of the 1933 Act' 0 8
and section 20(a) of the 1934 Act' 0 9 both hold that a person in control
of another who violates the securities laws shall be jointly and severally
liable with the violator.
Although the two concepts are quite similar, a critical difference ex-
ists regarding good faith. The control person provisions expressly pro-
vide relief from liability for proof of good faith;" 0 agency principles
102. Keuhnle, supra note 100, at 316-17. The Court expressly reserved decision about
aiding and abetting in Hochfelder. "[W]e need not consider whether civil liability for aiding
and abetting is appropriate under the section and the Rule, nor the elements necessary to
establish such a cause of action." Hochfilder, 425 U.S. at 191-92 n.7
103. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 316-17.
104. ld at 318.
105. See supra notes 132-57 and accompanying text for discussion of aider and abettor
liability.
106. Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 348.
107. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219(2) (1958).
108. The Securities and Exchange Act of 1933, § 15, 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1990) states:
Every person who, by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, or who,
pursuant to or in connection with an agreement or understanding with one or
more other person by or through stock ownership, agency, or otherwise, controls
any person liable under sections 77k or 771 of this title, shall also be liable jointly
and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person to any person
to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling person had no
knowledge of or reasonable ground to believe in the existence of the facts by
reason of which the liability of the controlled person is alleged to exist.
109. The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 20(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988) states:
Every person who, directly or indirectly, controls any person liable under any
provision of this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall also be
liable jointly and severally with and to the same extent as such controlled person
to any person to whom such controlled person is liable, unless the controlling
person acted in good faith and did not directly or indirectly induce the act or acts
constituting the violation or cause of action.
110. See Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 673-74 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part, remanded in part,
625 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980); Carpenter v. Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 868 (1979).
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under the doctrine of respondeat superior do not relieve the principal
from liability even when he acts in good faith."I ' The principal's liabil-
ity is, however, limited to the acts done within the scope of the agent's
employment. 1 2 The conflict between the two doctrines concerning
good faith has divided the courts over whether the two federal securities
provisions are exclusive of common law agency principles. 1 13 The ma-
jority of circuits hold that Congress did not intend to supplant agency
law with the controlling person provisions, but enacted the provisions to
provide an additional basis of secondary liability.' i4 In fact, the major-
ity of courts hold that respondeat superior has concurrent liability with
controlling person liability. 15 Nevertheless, under both provisions, lia-
bility is derivative. Absent an underlying violation by the controlled per-
son (registered representative), no claim against the controlling person
(brokerage firm) may be maintained.
116
Thus, in order for the plaintiff in Lafferty to succeed in an action
against the brokerage firm she must have shown: (1) a primary securi-
ties violation by the registered representative; and (2) control of that
representative by the brokerage firm."
7
Conversely, substantial disagreement exists between courts regard-
ing the correct operation of "control" in control person liability. The
dividing issue is whether the federal provisions apply only to individuals
who actively control the primary violator (culpable participation), or
whether the provisions also apply to individuals who have a general,
rather than a direct, relationship of control over the violator. Courts
that mandate culpable participation require the controlling person to
have control over the primary violator and to directly exercise that con-
111. See, e.g., New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188, 198 (1917) (holding em-
ployer who exercised utmost care still liable for acts of employees while acting in scope of
employment).
112. See Marbury Management, Inc. v. Kohn, 629 F.2d 705, 716 (2d Cir. 1980. See also
Harrison v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 1425 (N.D. Il1. 1989) (refusing to
impose liability on basis of respondeat superior where broker sold municipal bonds in
manner contrary to firm's rules and where transactions were "anything but regular");
Moss v. Morgan Stanley, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1347 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 719 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.
1983) (finding investment banker not liable for acts of employee/tippee because trading
on inside information not within the scope of employment); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § § 228-29 (1958) (defining acts within the scope of employment).
113. See Kuehnle, supra note 90, at 349-54. "The circuits are divided, with the clear
majority holding for agency liability and against exclusivity." Id. at 349.
114. Id. at 350.
115. Gerald F. Rath & David C. Boch, Selected Issues in Broker/Customer Litigation, 751
A.L.I.- A.B.A. Course of Study 557 (1992)[hereinafter Issues]. This carefully documented
work examines each circuit for their rulings on this issue and generally finds none that
have expressly denied concurrent liability, with the possible exception of the Third. Id.
For the Securities and Exchange Commission's view see the amicus brief in Hollinger
v. Titan Capital Appeal No. 87-3887 (9th Cir. file Nov. 9, 1989). See also Recent SEC Amicus
Brief Supports Respondeat Superior Liability in Private Action, 4 INSIGHrs 1 (Jan. 1990) (respon-
deat superior liability should be imposed concurrently with the statutory liability of section
20(a) to protect the public).
116. Deviries v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 805 F.2d 326 (8th Cir. 1986); Rob-
erts v. Heim, 670 F. Supp. 1466 (N.D. Cal. 1987); Baum v. Philips, Appel & Walden, 648 F.
Supp. 1518 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
117. Gruber v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 165 (D. Conn. 1988).
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trol with the intent to bring about a violation. Courts not mandating
culpable participation do not require participation by the controlling
person in the violation," 8 but some relation between control and the
violation is required. The circuit courts' positions suggest that some are
inclined to support secondary liability based merely on relationship,
while others impose liability based on action.' 19
In those jurisdictions requiring active or culpable participation, the
investor-plaintiff must show the controlling person's real control over
the violator. This may be shown from the relationship in general-as in
showing that the primary violator was an employee of the defendant cor-
poration. The plaintiff must then show that the scope of control in-
cluded the conduct that was the basis of the primary violation-as in
showing that the employee's particular violative conduct was within the
scope of the corporation's control. The plaintiff need not show, how-
ever, that the control was exercised to cause the violation.
This approach appears to comport with the intent of the statute.'
20
It requires the plaintiff to prove the ability to exercise control without
having to make the more difficult proof of the actual exercise of the con-
trol in this particular violation-a matter within the knowledge of the
defendant and relevant to the good faith defense. Thus, in courts fol-
lowing this approach the plaintiff must establish culpable participation
before the defendant addresses the good faith defense. 12 1 In those
courts not following the culpable participation approach, however, when
the plaintiff establishes the defendant had control over the primary vio-
lator the "control" element is satisfied and the burden immediately
shifts to the defendant to establish the good faith defense.
12 2
The Tenth Circuit appears to have rejected culpable participation.
It has imposed liability on brokerage firms for their representative's un-
derlying violation without reference to culpable participation.
123
Therefore, in Lafferty, had Ms. O'Connor been able to establish an un-
derlying violation by Foulke, the burden would shift to Lafferty to estab-
118. See, e.g., G.A. Thompson & Co v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 958 (5th Cir. 1981)
("Neither this [regulatory] definition nor the statute appears to require participation in the
wrongful transaction.")
119. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 354-55 n.21 1. Kuehnle found the following differ-
ent circuit treatments: three circuits appear to require culpable participation (Ninth, Sec-
ond and Third); five have rejected culpable participation either expressly or impliedly
through their analysis of the control elements in a way that is inconsistent with culpable
participation (Tenth, Eighth, Seventh, Sixth and Fifth); and the issue is unclear or has not
been decided in the remaining circuits (Fourth, First and D.C.). Id.
120. See supra notes 104-06 and accompanying text.
121. Orloffv. Allman, 819 F.2d 904, 906-07 (9th Cir. 1987); Christoffel v. E.F. Hutton
& Co., 588 F.2d 665, 667 (9th Cir. 1978); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d
761, 779 (3d Cir. 1976); Gordon v. Burr, 506 F.2d 1080, 1086 (2d Cir. 1974);
122. See San Francisco-Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp. v. Carstan Oil Co., 765
F.2d 962, 964 (10th Cir. 1985); Paul F. Newton & Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 630 F.2d
1111, 1120 (5th Cir. 1980); Hecht v. Harris Upham & Co., 283 F. Supp. 417, 438 (N.D.
Cal. 1986).
123. See, e.g., Busch v. Carpenter, 827 F.2d 653, 659-60 (10th Cir. 1987); San Francisco-
Oklahoma Petroleum Exploration Corp., 765 F.2d at 964-66; Richardson v. MacArthur, 451
F.2d 35, 41 (10th Cir. 1971).
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lish the good faith defense, because of its control of Foulke. 12 4
Both statutory provisions make available to the brokerage firm the
good faith defense. 125 To prove good faith:
it is necessary for the controlling person to show that some
precautionary measures were taken to prevent an injury caused
by an employee. . . . It is required of the controlling person
only that he maintain an adequate system of internal control
and that he maintain the system in a diligent manner.
126
The precise standard of supervision required of the brokerage firm to
establish the good faith defense is uncertain. 12 7 However, where the
registered representative completes the violative transaction through
the employing brokerage and the firm receives a commission on the
transaction, the burden of proving good faith is on the brokerage. 12
8
The brokerage must show that no negligence has occurred in supervi-
sion of the registered representative,' 29 and that it has maintained and
enforced a reasonably reliable system of supervision and internal con-
trol over such personnel.130 Thus, Lafferty could have defended against
the secondary liability claim by proving it had maintained and reason-
ably enforced a proper system of supervision over Foulke-in other
words, by establishing the good faith defense.
The doctrine of respondeat superior does not, however, provide
such a defense. Under this doctrine the primary focus concerns the
scope of employment and whether an employee's acts can fairly be con-
sidered within the scope of employment. 13 1 Here, the only defense
available to Lafferty is where Foulke acts beyond the scope of his em-
ployment. Obviously, whenever a court restricts the scope of primary
liability, it in effect restricts any derivative secondary liability. Again, as
a result of the Tenth Circuit's restricting the scope of primary liability
for the registered representative in Lafferty, the scope of secondary liabil-
ity for the brokerage firm was also restricted.
124. As a matter of law, a brokerage firm is a controlling person with respect to its
registered representatives. See Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564 (9th Cir.
1990).
125. See Carpenter v. Harris Upham & Co., Inc., 594 F.2d 388 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 868 (1979); Pharo v. Smith, 621 F.2d 656, 673-74 (5th Cir.), aff'd in part, remanded in
part, 625 F.2d 1226 (5th Cir. 1980) (analogous statutory provisions interpreted similarly).
126. Carpenter, 594 F.2d at 394. Accord Hollinger v. Titan Capital Corp., 914 F.2d 1564
(9th Cir. 1990) (stating that to prove good faith broker-dealer must show "supervisory
system was adequate and that it reasonably discharged its responsibilities under the sys-
tem"); Trustman v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [ 1984-85 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) V 91,936 (C.D. Cal. 1985) (holding that defendant was not in
compliance with duty of good faith). See generally, Note, The Burden of Control: Derivative
Liability Under Section 20(a) ofthe Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 48 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1019, 1037
(1973) (and cases cited therein).
127. See Marbury, 629 F.2d at 716.
128. Stern v. American Bankshares Corp., 429 F. Supp. 818, 823 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
129. SEC v. Geon Industries, Inc., 531 F.2d 39, 54 (2d Cir. 1976); Gordon, 506 F.2d at
1085-86.
130. Zweig v. Hearst Corp., 521 F.2d 1129, 1134-35 (9th Cir. 1975).
131. Marbury, 629 F.2d at 716.
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4. Secondary Liability Restricted for Aiding and Abetting
The case of Farlow v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 132 offers further
evidence of a Tenth Circuit trend to restrict liability in Rule 1Ob-5 cases.
During the period 1979 until 1986, Patrick Powers and his related enti-
ties (collectively Powers) offered and sold over fifty limited partnerships.
The limited partners. who invested in the offerings claimed that Powers
defrauded investors in 58 limited partnerships by making numerous
misrepresentations while the partnerships were nothing more than
"worthless shells" w-ithout value.133 The plaintiffs further claimed that
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Company (Peat Marwick), the accounting firm
that audited Powers, became "involved in the fraud" in April, 1981,
when it agreed to certify the Powers' financial statements, which it knew
to be "materially false and inaccurate." 134 The disgruntled limited part-
ners brought suit against the accounting firm for, inter alia, aiding and
abetting.135 The Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claims for failure to allege fraud with particularity under Rule
9(b).' 3 6 The court noted that the allegations failed to specify which
plaintiffs had dealt directly with Peat Marwick, from which persons the
plaintiffs had purchased their interests, and on which occasions the mis-
representations were made and how they were directed to plaintiffs.1
3 7
Employers and.others, including agents such as accountants and at-
torneys, can be held liable under an aiding and abetting charge.
Although the federal securities laws generally do not provide for such
liability' 3 8 and the U.S. Supreme Court has reserved ruling on the is-
sue, 139 courts almost universally infer liability for aiding and abetting by
utilizing the joint tortfeasor language in the Restatement (Second) of
Torts. 140 In order to establish aider and abettor liability under Rule lOb-
5, the facts must show a violation by the primary violator, knowledge of
that violation by an aider and abettor, and "substantial assistance" by
the aider and abettor.'
4 '
132. 956 F.2d 982 (10th Cir. 1992).
133. Farlow, 956 F.2d at 985.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 986.
136. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides: "In all averments of
fraud or mistake, the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall be stated with par-
ticularity." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(b).
137. Farlow, 956 F.2d at 987-89.
138. There are a few provisions of the federal securities laws that expressly provide for
aiding and abetting liability. See, e.g., Investment Advisors Act § 209 (e), 15.U.S.C. § 80b-
9(e) (1990). Broker-dealers are subject to administrative sanctions for willfully aiding and
abetting violations of the federal securities laws. Id. See also Securities Exchange Act of
1934 § 15(b)(4)(E), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4)(E) (1990)(allowing the Commission to censure,
place limitations on activities, suspend or revoke the license of broker dealers who willfully
aid or abet violation).
139. See Hochfetder, 425 U.S. at 191 n.7.
140. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 321-22.
141. Employers Insurance of Wausau v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1982
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) t 98,792 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). See Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79 (2d Cir. 1983) (aiding and abetting churning allegation against
stockbroker sufficient to withstand motion to dismiss); Board of Trustees v. Liberty Group,
708 F. Supp. 1504 (N.D. Ill. 1989). See generally, Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauder-
[Vol. 70:4852
1993] SECURITIES L4 W 853
The second and third elements of aiding and abetting liability pres-
ent the greatest difficulty. The first element, a violation by a primary
violator usually has been decided by the time aiding and abetting liabil-
ity is being considered. The two difficult elements demand a determina-
tion of the level of assistance and knowledge required in order to apply
liability for aiding and abetting. In determining the level of assistance
required courts turn again to the Restatement, which imposes liability
when one person breaches a duty and another gives "substantial assist-
ance or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself."' 4 2 While
the defendant may be aware a violation is occurring, unless he acts to aid
the violation or fails to act when he had a duty, no liability attaches.
143
The Restatement measures assistance essentially under the principles of
causation.144 An "[aictor's negligent conduct [will be] the legal cause of
harm to another if ... his conduct is a substantial factor in the bringing
about [of] the harm .... ,,145 Thus, in determining whether substantial
assistance has been given by the aider and abettor, one must find a sub-
stantial causal connection between the assistance and the violation.
That causal connection can arise from either the aider's action or inac-
tion, as long as the action or inaction caused the harm. 146 In determin-
ing the causal connection, and thus the degree of assistance,
consideration is given to the number and effect of other variables, and to
whether the conduct was harmless until acted upon by other forces or
was part of a continuous stream of forces leading to the resulting
harm. 1
4 7
dale, 765 F.2d 1004 (11th Cir. 1985); Cleary v. Perfectune, Inc., 700 F.2d 774 (1st Cir.
1983); Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co., Inc., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir. 1978); Rochez
Brothers, Inc. v. Rhoades, 527 F.2d 880, 886 (3d Cir. 1975); Hemming v. Alfin Fragrances,
Inc., 690 F. Supp. 239 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b) (1977).
143. Monsen v. Consolidated Dressed Beef Co., 579 F.2d 793, 800 (3d Cir. 1978)
(holding "mere knowledge of a violation alone, without assistance or a duty to disclose the
violation, is not an actionable wrong").
144. The cmt. for clause b of § 876 states: "In determining liability, the factors are the
same as those used in determining the existence of legal causation when there has been
negligence ... or recklessness .... " RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876(b), cmt. d
(1977). See also Mendelsohn v. Capital Underwriters, Inc., 490 F. Supp. 1069, 1084 (N.D.
Cal. 1979) (finding there must be substantial causal connection between conduct of al-
leged aider and abettor and harm to plaintiff).
145. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 430, cmt. d (1977).
It is not necessary that it be the cause, using the word 'the' as meaning the
sole or even the predominant cause. The wrongful conduct of a number of third
persons may also be a cause of the harm, so that such third persons may be liable
for it, concurrently with the actor.
lId (emphasis in original).
146. See Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 342.
[L]iability for nonaction requires a showing of the breach of a duty or a show-
ing of conscious intent. A breach of duty can constitute causal assistance. If one
owed a duty to the plaintiff and the failure to fulfill the duty permitted the harm to
occur, the person owing the duty could be said to have assisted the violation. The
duty, the breach of which could be said to be a cause of the harm, could arise
from a statutory obligation under the securities laws or from another, indirect
basis of duty including custom, practice, contract, or special relationship.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
147. See, e.g., Wessel v. Buhler, 437 F.2d 279, 282-83 (9th Cir. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 533 (1977). Kuehnle states:
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In determining the level of knowledge required for an aider and
abettor, the Second Circuit in Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman Dillon & Co. ,148 con-
sidered whether the Rule lOb-5 standard of knowledge matched the sci-
enter needed for primary lOb-5 liability. The court concluded that "the
basic holding of Hochfelder, that scienter is an element of the section
10(b)/Rule lOb-5 cause of action, also establishes the standard for aid-
ing and abetting liability."' 14 9 Considering whether recklessness consti-
tutes scienter for an aiding and abetting violation, the Second Circuit
concluded that "at least where, as here, the alleged aider and abettor
owes a fiduciary duty to the defrauded party, recklessness satisfies the
scienter requirement." 15o
Although the issue of recklessness for Rule lOb-5 liability is not
fully resolved, it has almost universal acceptance as constituting scienter
for primary lOb-5 violations. However, recklessness is not as well ac-
cepted for secondary aider and abettor liability. Some courts allow reck-
lessness to satisfy the scienter requirement for aider and abettor liability
without any special circumstances.' 5 1 Other courts recognize reckless-
ness as an appropriate standard only under special circumstances. For
example, courts requiring special circumstances have allowed reckless-
ness to satisfy the scienter requirement in aider and abettor liability
where a fiduciary relationship exists between the victim and the aider
and abettor, 15 2 where the aider and abettor could reasonably foresee
that the plaintiff would rely upon his actions 1 53 and where the aider and
Activity that is otherwise harmless does not constitute assistance where the
activity has been made harmful by the intervention of other, corrupting forces.
Thus, where an accountant prepares interim financial statements for a company
and informs the company of deficiencies in the company's books, the accountant
is not liable for the subsequent alteration of those statements and their use in a
prospectus by another.
Kuehnle, supra note 100, at 340 n.154. But see SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541-
42 (2d Cir. 1973)(giving opinion letter on securities issue makes securities lawyer partici-
pant in stream of events leading to securities transaction; letter may be legal causal factor
constituting substantial assistance even if flow of events takes several turns).
148. 570 F.2d 38, 44 (2d Cir. 1977).
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. See Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d 669, 684 (6th Cir. 1981) (holding circuit law is
either scienter or recklessness is sufficient to fulfill requirement); Edward J. Mawod & Co.
v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979) (prevailing rule is willful or reckless behavior
satisfies scienter requirement).
152. See Woods v. Barnett Bank of Fort Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11 th Cir.
1985) (holding severe recklessness satisfies scienter requirement in aiding and abetting
case, at least where alleged aider and abettor owes duty to defrauded party); Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 699 F.2d 79, 91 (2d Cir. 1983) (owing fiduciary duty to plaintiff makes reckless-
ness sufficient for liability for aider and abettor); IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 923 (2d
Cir. 1980) (noting that fiduciary duty is recognized as special consideration allowing reck-
lessness as satisfaction of scienter requirement for aider and abettor liability); Rof, 570
F.2d at 48 (alleged aider and abettor owing fiduciary duty allows recklessness to satisfy
scienter requirement); Hudson v. Capital Mgmt. Int'l, Inc., 565 F. Supp. 615, 624 (N.D.
Cal. 1983) (ruling that recklessness only suffices fiduciary or analogous relationship binds
defendant to plaintiff).
153. See Woods, 765 F.2d at 1011 (following precedent applying "'recklessness standard
to alleged aiders and abettors who have issued statements or certifications foreseeably
relied upon by investors"); Fund of Funds, Ltd. v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 545 F. Supp.
1314, 1356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (stating although courts generally don't regard accountant-
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abettor receives a benefit from the fraud.15 4
Still other courts developed and utilized a sliding scale approach
linking the level of knowledge required to the degree of assistance ren-
dered. 15 5 This approach scales the level of knowledge upward or down-
ward depending upon the amount and type of assistance rendered. A
stronger showing of knowledge is required where the assistance is re-
mote or routine. 15 6 In 1979 the Tenth Circuit followed the less restric-
tive approach toward aiding and abetting liability and stated "[t]he
prevailing rule would appear to be that... reckless behavior satisfies the
scienter requirement" for aiding and abetting.1
5 7
However, in Farlow, the Tenth Circuit, following the trend of re-
stricting the scope of liability, also stated that it is not the law that whis-
tle-blowing to protect investors is necessitated whenever an accountant
discovers his client to be in financial trouble. 158 The failure to disclose
material information is actionable only where a duty to disclose arises,-
when one party has information that the other party is entitled to know
because of a fiduciary or other similar relation of trust and confidence
between them.159 The duty to disclose does not arise from the relation-
ship between the parties merely because one party has an ability to ac-
quire information.
The court in Farlow, like the Lafferty court, affirmatively addressed
an issue that did not direct its decision. The facts in Farlow permitted
the court to dismiss the case for failing to specifically plead fraud pursu-
ant to Rule 9(b). 160 Yet, the court stepped forward and restricted the
scope of Rule lOb-5 liability by refusing to adopt the whistleblower or
client relationship as fiduciary, recklessness standard applies where accountant's mislead-
ing audit or opinion letter leads to foreseeable reliance); Morgan v. Prudential Group,
Inc., 527 F. Supp. 957, 961 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (holding that reliance on attorney's tax opin-
ion is foreseeable, and where foreseeability of reliance is apparent recklessness standard
may be applied); Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litig., 523 F. Supp. 550, 558
(S.D.N.Y. 1980) (ruling recklessness sufficient to establish scienter where plaintiff/third
party reliance on accountant's audit or opinion letter is reasonably foreseeable).
154. See Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761, 780 (3d Cir. 1976)
(knowledge requirement less strict where alleged aider and abettor derives benefits from
wrongdoing).
155. See, e.g., Abell v. Potomac Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 1104, 1126-27 (5th Cir. 1988)(ex-
plaining previously adopted test that establishes scienter by relating level of assistance to
level of intent); Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 624 (8th Cir. 1985) (holding knowledge
and assistance factors vary inversely relative to one another; where evidence of substantial
assistance is slim requirement of knowledge or scienter is enhanced); Cornfeld, 619 F.2d at
923.
156. See, e.g., Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1975) ("scienter
requirement scales upward when activity is more remote").
157. EdwardJ. Mawod & Co. v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979).
158. Farlow, 956 F.2d at 988.
"That [whistleblower liability] would be an extreme theory of accountants'
liability, and it is one we decline to embrace as an interpretation of the common
law of Illinois, having in previous cases specifically rejected it as a possible theory
of Rule lOb-5 aider and abettor liability."
Id. at 988 (citing Barker v. Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, 797 F.2d 490 (7th Cir.
1986) and LHLC Corp. v. Cluett, Peabody & Co., 842 F.2d 928, 932-33 (7th Cir. 1988).
159. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SEc-
OND) OF TORTS § 551(2)(a) (1976)).
160. Farlow, 956 F.2d at 984-89.
1993]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
financial Good Samaritan theory of liability for accountant liability,
thereby refusing to expand the duty to disclose.
16'
III.CONCLUSION
Although the Tenth Circuit is not a hot bed for securities litigation,
it nonetheless is subject to the trend to restrict the scope of Rule lOb-5
liability. Without articulating its position, the Tenth Circuit has illus-
trated through three decisions last year its reluctance to expand securi-
ties fraud liability. Indeed, the court addressed questions restricting
Rule lOb-5 liability when such questions were never posed. The Tenth
Circuit now requires specific allegations of the who, what, where, when
and how in pleading a lOb-5 violation in order to defeat an opposing
motion for summary judgment or dismissal. The court also requires the
element of control for unsuitability claims based on fraud by conduct
and no whistleblower or financial good Samaritan theory of liability ex-
ists in the Tenth Circuit. One may argue that these imposed require-
ments illustrate the Tenth Circuit's willingness to take affirmative steps
to reduce securities fraud litigation by restricting liability. Evident from
their voiced concerns, the business sector shares an attitude that securi-
ties fraud litigation has grown beyond an acceptable limit and affirma-
tive steps need to be taken to reduce liability. This attitude is already
apparent in the courts, as witnessed from their application of securities
fraud issues. What remains uncertain is whether Congress agrees with
this attitude. The answer to that question shall remain a matter of spec-
ulation until Congress hears the Senate and House bills in 1993.
BrentJ Gregoire
161. Cf The Financial Fraud Detection and Disclosure Act H.R. 4313, 102d Cong., 1st
Sess. (1992) (Whistleblower Act) introduced by Rep. Ron Wyden, (D-OR), approved by
the full House Energy and Commerce Committee July 28, 1992 and opposed by AICPA.
American Banker-Bond Buyer, a Div. of Thomson's Int'l Bank Accountant, 2 U.S. BANK
AcCouN rING LEDGER 38, at 6 (October 12, 1992) available in LEXIS, Nexis Library The bill
would authorize the SEC to direct independent auditors to investigate their clients for
fraud and other wrongdoing. Id. The proposal would require auditors to report manage-
ment fraud to company officials, and also set forth procedures for auditors to follow if they
discover potential illegalities during the course of an audit engagement. Id.
[Vol. 70:4
